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By Democratic Audit
Government “Tsars” need to be accountable, too
The use of Government “Tsars”  - experts brought in to advise Ministers on particular policy areas – has
exploded in recent years, with the current Government appointing over 100 since coming to office in May
2010. Here, Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury show that the role of these “Tsars” is ill-defined and poorly
recorded, and conclude that they fail to meet the standards of proper democratic accountability. 
You probably know of  Andew
Dilnot, John Vickers and Mary
Portas as government advisers
or so-called ‘tsars’ – on social
care, banking ref orm and the
f uture of  the high street
respectively. What of  Graham
Allen, Reg Bailey, Pauline
Neville Jones or Charlotte
Leslie? They too were
appointed to advise Coalit ion
ministers: Allen on early years
intervention, Bailey on the
commercialization and
sexualization of  childhood,
Neville Jones on cybersecurity,
Leslie as a Big Society
Ambassador. If  they’re less
well-known that’s not
surprising, since the Coalit ion
has appointed more than 100 such independent policy advisers since 2010. For over 15 years tsars have
been a growing, unrecognized and largely hidden source of  inf luence on ministers’ decisions.
Individual appointments are usually announced in a departmental press notice, yet neither departments nor
the Cabinet Of f ice maintain proper records about all of  them. Departments’ Annual Reports rarely note the
progress of  these advisers’ work. Some tsars never even produce a written report, presumably brief ing
ministers and of f icials in other ways, if  at all. Only occasionally have Select Committees picked up on the
work of  tsars and called them in – as did the Communities and Local Government Committee recently with
Mary Portas.
In our research published last year we revealed, f or the f irst t ime, the scale and scope of  tsar
appointments since 1997. We f ound that:
The annual rate of  appointments has increased progressively over the last f our administrations (see
f ig 1)
Fig 1: annual rate of appointments over the last four Parliaments
The league table of  ministers who appoint tsars puts Gordon Brown in the top slot with 46
appointments in all, 23 as Chancellor and 23 as Prime Minister; David Cameron has made 21 so f ar.
Tsars come principally f rom business (40% of  the total) and the public service (37%) with a
smattering of  researchers, lawyers and media people; 18% were serving polit icians, like Graham Allen
and Charlotte Leslie above, or were f ormerly polit icians, like Alan Milburn, the social mobility adviser.
Some can be characterized as specialists (with relevant prof essional expertise in the f ield in which
they are appointed to work); others are generalists (working outside their career expertise, applying
management experience to the task) or advocates (with known expertise but also known views – the
case with the polit icians and certain others).
A f ew come to the task with a high media prof ile – sometimes dubbed ‘celebrity tsars’ – ministers
seem to like being associated with them.
Overall they are strikingly un-diverse: predominantly male (85%), white (98%), over 50 years old on
appointment (83%), and 38% were tit led.
Interviewing tsars and their civil servant advisers showed just how ramshackle (or non-existent) the
processes f or their appointment and guidelines f or conduct of ten are. There is no f ormal guidance and
departments and appointees simply make it up as they go:
Recruitment may be by phone call, sometimes f rom the minister, rarely involving a real interview – the
person approached is usually known by, or known to, a minister, so it is very much a personal
appointment. Pay-of f  to a sacked minister seems to explain some appointments.
Background checks f or possible conf licts of  interest or other sources of  potential embarrassment
are of ten absent or superf icial – witness the recent case of  James Caan, appointed to advise on
helping young people get on in work without leg-ups, only to be revealed by the media as having
given employment to his own children.
Written terms of  ref erence are not standard practice, nor is there any requirement about how openly
the tsar should conduct the work – some of f er nothing more until they publish a report. It seems to
be assumed that any tsar knows how to undertake serious policy analysis.
Some of  these advisers get paid, some do not (and may not wish to be), yet the subject may not
even be raised at the start. Payments vary: £200K pa was the highest we identif ied.
Who owns the ‘intellectual property’ and responsibility f or the advice? This is rarely addressed
explicit ly, although it can make a big dif f erence to the perceived independence of  the work.
Departments keep no f ormal records of  their tsar appointments, and even struggle (and, in some
cases, decline) to respond to FOI requests f or inf ormation about particular appointments.
There has been no evaluation of  the perf ormance of  tsars, individually or collectively, so
departments don’t really learn about good practice.
The Coalit ion has already appointed more tsars than special advisers (Spads). As the slimming down of  the
civil service continues, tsars, Spads plus advisers made into temporary civil servants could soon outnumber
the senior civil servants. Perhaps that is what ministers want. In their Civil Service Reform Plan (July 2012 )
they pledged more ‘open policy making’ by greater outsourcing of  policy advice, to break what they argued
was Whitehall’s ‘virtual monopoly on policy development.’ That ‘monopoly’ is a myth: many sources of
external advice have long been available to and used by departments and ministers – including consultants,
researchers, advisory committees, scientif ic advisers, consultations, as well as tsars.
The government has missed the crucial point about accountability and openness. All the other sources are
‘regulated’ through codes of  practice, to make proper and ef f ective arrangements. Only tsars remain
unregulated. Our research shows that there are advantages f or ministers in having access to external
advice on the f lexible, inf ormal and speedy basis that tsars provide. That does not have to mean hasty,
careless or clandestine practices.
These are public appointments, f unded by public money. They have to be accountable.  Neither the Cabinet
Of f ice nor the Commissioner f or Public Appointments seems willing to secure that accountability. Tsars do
not even have to observe the Seven Principles of  Public Lif e.
That is why we launched a draf t code of  practice f or independent policy advisers on 15 October 2013 at
King’s College London.
This is a short, simple code, drawing on the advice of  a number of  f ormer tsars, civil servants who worked
with them, journalists and academics who observe the ways of  Whitehall. The code addresses propriety
and ef f ectiveness. Regarding propriety, the code sets basic, minimum steps f or selection and appointment,
with continuing oversight by a senior responsible of f icial; clarity about remuneration; assessment of
conf licts of  interest in advance; written terms of  ref erence; greater diversity in the appointees; and a
commitment to publicize tsar appointments, to publish their reports and to respond f ormally to them.
For ef f ectiveness the code requires more thought to be given to job and person specif ications to help to
identif y candidates with relevant experience or expertise; the code encourages tsars to be open in how
they conduct their work; and a f inal, f ully evidenced and argued report should be the norm. Also that the
work of  tsars should be reported in departments’ Annual Reports and that departments should periodically
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of  previous appointments to inf orm the development of  good
practice.
Media coverage of  our code prompted the Cabinet Of f ice to state: “It is entirely appropriate, and in the
public interest, f or Government to draw on a wide range of  advice. Successive administrations have chosen
to bring in external expertise in various ways to provide an additional resource to ministers in considering
dif f icult and complex issues. We think it ’s important to maintain a degree of  f lexibility in such appointments,
particularly since they may be required to be made at short notice.”
Indeed – but f lexibility and speedy action are not incompatible with propriety and ef f ectiveness. Nor can
they be an excuse f or inadequate democratic accountability.
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